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wITH JOHN MARSHALL FROM WILLIAM AND MARY
TO DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
FLORIAN BARTosIC*

THE WLLIAM am MARY CASE

Thomas Jefferson records in his Autobiography:
On the 1st of June 1779. I was appointed Governor of the Commonwealth and retired from the legislature. Being elected also one of
the Visitors of Win. & Mary college, a self-electing body, I effected,
during my residence in Williamsburg that year, [on December 4,
1779] a change in the organization of that institution by [among other
things] abolishing the Grammar School... and substituting a professorship of Law &Police ...
At least one person was not pleased with the reorganization of the
College, namely, the Rev. John Bracken, master of the grammar school,
who because of it was without a position. In October, 1787, almost
eight years later, he petitioned a Virginia district court for a writ of
mandamus to cause the visitors of the college to restore him to his
"place and office of grammar master, and professor of humanity."
"[O]n account of difficulty" 2 the case was adjourned to the General
Court of Appeals of Virginia and was argued before that court in
December of 1790. Counsel for the College was John Marshall, "the
leading lawyer of Virginia"' 3 one time student at William and Mary4
and one day to become "the Great Chief Justice'ad
* Of the Va. Bar; Pontifical College Josephenian (Ohio) B. A. (1948); College of
William and Mary B. C. L. (1965); House Counsel, Int. Bro. of Teamsters, and Lecturer in Law, Catholic Univ. of America.
I. 1 Tim WRmNGs OF THOMAS JmsoN 69-70 (Ford ed. 1892).
2. Bracken v. Visitors of the College of William & Mary, 3 Call. (7 Va.) 573, 579
(1790). The reporter does not explain what the "difficulty" was; presumably, the case
was removed to the appellate court because of the complex issues involved.
3. 2 BEvERIDr, Tim LwE OF JoHN M am
168 (1916) (hereinafter cited as Beveridge). See Appendix 1, List of Cases Argued by Marshall before the Court of Appeals
of Virginia, 2 BEVERIDGE 568.

4. Bracken's misfortune had been Marshall's good fortune. When the grammar
school was abolished, a chair of Law and Police was established-the first of its
kind in the United States and antedated in the English-speaklng world only by Blackstone's Vinerian professorship at Oxford. George Wythe was its first occupan and
Marshall in 1780 attended the "course of law lectures given by Mr. Wythe, and of
lectures of Natural philosophy given by Mr. Madison the President of Wiam. and
Mary College". An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall 6 (Adams ed. 1937).
See 1 BEVERmGE 157-161.
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In his opening argument to the court, Marshall, citing three English
cases, made the point that a writ of mandamus does not lie in the case
of a private eleemosynary institution for which visitors had been appointed. The reporter notes that "Mr. Marshall was here stopped, and
the position that a mandamus will not lie in the case of a private
Eleemosynary institution, where Visitors were appointed, was admitted
to be law".5 Marshall went on to argue that William and Mary was
such an institution, and that, even if it were not and the court did have

jurisdiction, the writ ought not to issue since the visitors had but exercised the powers conferred upon them by the charter which King
William and Queen Mary had granted the College in 1693. But Mr.

Bracken's counsel, John Taylor," implied that the College was a public
or quasi-public institution, and he insisted that the visitors had limited
powers and that in abolishing the grammar school and discharging its
master, they had exceeded their authority. Further, he contended, the

meeting at which the reorganization plan was adopted had not been
attended by a "sufficient number of members to form a convocation", 7
proper notice had not been given, and Mr. Bracken had been deprived

of his office without a hearing.
The court passed over the interesting and rather detailed arguments

of counsel as to whether the college was a private, public or quasipublic institution, and "on the merits of the case" 8 refused the writ to
5. Bracken v. Visitors of The College of William and Mary. Supra note 2 at 580. In
his rebuttal Marshall declared: "The authorities in support of this position, were too
numerous to be opposed." Id. at 591. Marshall's citation of authorities in the William
& Mary case is emphasized, for he was not a lawyer who relied to any great extent
upon precedents. See 2 BEVwRIDGE 179, 180. It is interesting to note that he, who was
later to distinguish himself as the constitutional statesman par excellence in creating
precedents, displayed little inclination or facility for citing authorities as a lawyer.
6. This may have been John Taylor of Caroline, who was later to attack the
nationalist principles of Marshall's M'Culloch v. Maryland opinion in his States Rights
classic, CoNsTRuCnoN CONStrUED, AND CoNsnTUoN ViNDicAmr.
See 4 BEVERiDG 335-339.
7. Bracken v. Visitors of the College of William and Mary. Supra note 2, at 589.
8. Id. at 599; In the second William and Mary case, Bracken v. College of William
and Mary, 1 Call. (5 Va.) 161, 163, 164 (1797), President of the Court, Pendleton, who
also sat on the court that heard the first case, gives us his explanation of why the court
in 1790 denied the petition for a mandamus "on the merits": "1st To shew the
case had been fully entered into, as if the papers had been before us on the return of
the mandamus. 2d. To meet an objection warmly insisted on, that the General Court
had no power to intermeddle with the affairs of the College, upon the English precedents, applying to private donations for Colleges; but which some of the judges at
least, of whom I was one, thought did not apply to our College, which had a public
and not a private foundation: and to avoid a supposition, that the denial was on that
ground ... "
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restore Bracken to his former position. While the case (statement of
facts, arguments of counsel and opinion) amounts to twenty-six pages
in Call's Reports, the court's opinion consists of four lines.
The Rev. Mr. Bracken, however, was not to be put off so easily.
He went to court again, this time with an action for arrearages of salary.
In this second case a Mr. Randolph appeared for the college, John
Marshall having gone to France on the X Y Z mission.' The district
court found against him, and the matter was again brought before the
Court of Appeals. But the appellate court made short shrift of the
appeal: "if he had no right to the office, he could have none of the
salary." 10
Of course, the fascinating question presents itself: to what extent did
the reasoning of Marshall, the lawyer, in the William and Mary case
affect the opinion of Marshall, the Chief Justice, in Dartmouth College?"
MARSHALL AS LAWYER At) AS CHIEF JUSTICE

That Darmouth's charter was a contract-a crucial and basic issue
in the 1819 case-Marshall thought was at most one step removed from
the self-evident: "It can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a contract." ' 2 Nevertheless he did
devote four sentences to the point. Then he addressed himself at much
greater length to the following questions before resolving them in the
affirmative:
1. Is this contract protected by the constitution of the United
States?
2. Is it impaired by the acts [of the New Hampshire legislature]
under which the defendant holds? 13
The facts, the holding and the significance of the Dartmouth College
9. 2 BEVEWmGE 257-289.

10. Bracken v. Visitors of the College of William and Mary. Supra note 8, 1 Call
(5 Va.) at 164.
11. Surely Marshall had access to 3 Call which had appeared in 1805. Beveridge
records that "Marshall . . . prepared his opinion under his trees at Richmond and

in the mountains during the vacation of 1818 . . :'4 BE.vERmc 274.
12. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., (17 U.S.) 518, 627
(1819). David Loth has commented: "As was customary with the Chief Justice, he
devoted most of his opinion to proving points which had general agreement, and
stated the really controversial elements as a simple fact. In this case, the only new
point he was deciding was whether such a charter as Dartmouth possessed was a contract." Lor, Csnrw JusncE Jom MAxsaALL Am Tn Gaowr oF mn RP"Uc 296
(1949).
13. Ibid.
14. 4 BEvmoE 277.
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case are well known. In the words of Beveridge, "[i]t reassured investors in corporate securities, and gave confidence and steadiness to
the business world", 14 and Charles Beard saw it as "a spectacular event
more important in American educational history than the founding of
any single institution of higher learning". 15 Professor Fred Rodell has
sketched the political background of the case and has outlined Marshall's
opinion of thirty pages with a conciseness and clarity that are as refreshing to students of the Supreme Court as they must be depressing
to the pedantic monograph boys.
In order to sustain his academic fellow Federalists, John Marshall
had to rule that a charter was the same as a contract (this was brandnew legal doctrine); that the promises of the British Crown in granting
the charter were still binding, despite the Revolution, on the state of
New Hampshire (this was also new); and that therefore the New
Hampshire statute was unconstitutional because it "impaired the
obligation of contracts." By such tortuous and unprecedented legal
argumentation,"s with an assist from Webster's sentimentality, Marshall
7
managed to hold the fort for Dartmouth's Federalist trustees.'
It is clear that the William and Mary case, in which Marshall had
represented the College, was not directly in point with the Dartmouth
case. In the latter, it was the legislature of New Hampshire which had
reorganized the College; in the former, the visitors of the College had
effectuated the reorganization. In the New Hampshire case, the issue
was the constitutionality of the action of the legislature; the issue in the
Virginia case was the legality of the action of the visitors in removing
the grammar master. However, at the heart of both controversies were
the charters granted by the British Crown to the Colleges. Chief
Justice Marshall asserted in the Dartmouth case: "It becomes then the
duty of the Court most seriously to examine this charter, and to ascertain
its true character." 18 In the William and Mary case John Taylor,
counsel for Mr. Bracken, had affirmed:
The charter is the magnet, from whence every part of the business
must take its direction. It is the constitution of the College, and, like
all other constitutions, ought to be preserved inviolate. In this instance
15. 1 BEARD, Tar, RIsE OF A.mmucAN CIViLIZAToIN 819 (1928).

16. There are two citations to Blackstone, but not a single case is cited by the Chief
Justice. By way of contrast, see Justice Story's precedent-laden concurring opinion.
17. RoDELT, Nnmn MEN: A PoLmcAL HisroRy OF TH SupRmE CouRT FRoM 1790 To
1955 95-96 (1955).
18. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. Supra note 13, at 630-631.
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it must be preserved inviolate for the benefit of all parties, because its
destruction will take from both sides the subject of controversy.19
Marshall himself, as a lawyer, in pressing the point that the visitors
might modify the schools of William and Mary, had added: "provided20
they did not depart from the great outlines marked in the charter."
He admitted that they had "no power to change that which is established by the charter" 1
"If the acts of the Visitors are at all examinable in this Court, none
can be supported which transcend the limits prespribed for them in the
charter which gives them being, and from which their power is
drawn." 2 The William and Mary charter had granted certain joint
life estates to the masters of the college. In speaking of these, Marshall
had reasoned:
But, these estates are the gift of the founder. They are his voluntary
gift. To this gift he may annex such conditions as his own will or
caprice may dictate. Every individual, to whom it is offered, may
accept or reject it; but, if he accepts, he accepts it subject to the conditions annexed by the donor.23
Moreover, although most of the legal questions involved in the
William and Mary and Dartmouth cases were only indirectly related,
there was in both (at least as counsel argued the William and Mary case)
a common, pivotal issue: were the institutions public or private ones?
If public, then it followed that both legislature and courts could rightly
consider the colleges within their bailiwick. If private, the contrary
result should be reached.
Counsel for the discharged grammar master had implied that the
college was a public or quasi-public institution:
The acts of Assembly, which give a revenue to the College arising
from certain duties, convert it into an object of public concern.
It is, in many respects in its origin, a corporation for public government, and whose proceedings must therefore be subject to the control
of this Court
It has a right to a member of Assembly....
19. 3 Cal 573, 581.
20. Id. at 580.
21. Id. at 596.

22. Id. at 595.
23. Id. at 592.
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They [the masters of the college] have the office of the surveyor
general; and, having that office, appoint all the surveyors to the different counties throughout Virginia. This is an office which nearly
concerns the public and gives to the College completely a public
character.2 4
But advocate Marshall pointed out that the power of the College to
elect a member of the Virginia Assembly had been taken from it by
the state constitution, and he argued that even though the office of
surveyor general held by the college was "of public concern... it
cannot affect the case."
As this mandamus is not applied for to compel the College to proceed ... to the appointment of a county surveyor, the argument does
not touch the case, unless it be intended to prove, that if a case
can exist in which a mandamus might be awarded to the College, it
may be awarded in any case; that if there be a power annexed to the
corporation to do any one act which concerns the public, the whole
corporation immediately changes its nature, and from a private,
becomes a public corporation. Unless the argument proves this, it
proves nothing.25
With respect to the revenues from duties granted to the College by the
Virginia Assembly, Marshall reasoned:
... the acts of Assembly giving certain duties to the College are
relied on as giving the government a right, by its Courts, to supervise
the disposition of those revenues.
The College was founded by William and Mary. Since its foundation, the bounty of Virginia has been added to that of the original
founders. It is an established principle, that all annexed foundations
follow, and are governed by the rules of the old foundation to which
they are annexed (The King v. The Bishop of Ely), 1 Win. Black. Rep.
77, 87. The gift of any individual, then, to a chartered corporation,
is subject to the laws which control the original donation. That this
gift was made by the public, does not alter the case; because, it is
decided, that Colleges of Royal foundation are not different from
those of private foundation. Where the King has appointed Visitors,
their power is precisely the same as where a private founder has appointed them. Of consequence, a donation to an old foundation,

24. Id. at 590.
25. Id. at 593.
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though made by the public, is as subject to the fundamental law of the
corporation, as the donation of an individual would be.2
And Marshall also maintained:
[TIhis [s] a private, and not a public institution. The persons who
compose it have no original property of their own, but it belongs to
the corporation. It is, then, completely Eleemosynary. In many of
the cases, Colleges and hospitals are classed together as private
Eleemosynary corporations, subject to the wil of the founder. There
would seem to be no principle on which this College should be
placed in a different class of corporations from all other Colleges.7
... That the masters have estates, as masters, cannot convert this
into a public corporation; for, all masters must have salaries as masters;
in all charitable institutions something is given, which the professors,
if there be any, receive as professors; and, if this was the criterion of a
public institution, there could be none private in their nature.28
Just as Marshall, the lawyer, could argue for this conclusion on the
facts of the William and Mary case, so Marshall, the Chief Justice, quite
understandably, had no difficulty in holding Dartmouth College to be a
private corporation.
Whence... can be derived the idea, that Dartmouth College has
become a public institution, and its trustees public officers, exercising
powers conferred by the public for public objects? Not from the
source whence its funds were drawn; for its foundation is purely
private and eleemosynary-Not from the application of those funds;
for money may be given for education, and the persons receiving it
do not, by being employed in the education of youth, become members of the civil government. Is it from the act of incorporation 2
[No, for] The character of civil institutions does not grow out of
their incorporation, but out of the manner in which they are formed,
and the objects for which they are created.30
The particular interests of New Hampshire never entered the mind
of the donors... The propagation of the christian religion among the
savages, and the dissemination of useful knowledge among the youth
of the country, were the avowed and the sole objects of their con26. Id. at 592, 593.
27. Id. at 591.

28. Id. at 592.
29. 4 Wheat. 518, 635, 636 (1819).
30. Id. at 638.
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tributions. In these New Hampshire would participate; but nothing
particular or exclusive was intended for her.3 '
Thus did Chief Justice Marshall reach one of the fundamental propositions upon which his 1819 opinion was based: Dartmouth College
was a private eleemosynary corporation.
CONCLUSION

A comparison of the William and Mary case, in which John Marshall
represented his alma mater, with his noted Dartmouth College opinion
shows that there was a vital issue common to both: was the college
concerned a private eleemosynary corporation? Other questions involved in the two cases were only collaterally related. However, it
seems that the Chief Justice's reasoning in 1819 was in certain respects
grounded upon premises only one step removed from the reasoning of
Marshall, the lawyer, in 1790.82
It is not insignificant that eyewitness Professor Chauncey A. Goodrich
related to Rufus Choate that the eloquent Daniel Webster in his argument to the Supreme Court in behalf of the trustees of Dartmouth
College was overcome by emotion after he had addressed Marshall:
Sir, you may destroy this little Institution; it is weak; it is in your
hands! I know it is one of the lesser lights in the literary horizon of
our country. You may put it out. But if you do, you must carry
through your work! You must extinguish, one after another, all those
great lights of science which, for more than a century, have thrown
radiance over our land!
It is, Sir, as I have said, a small College. And yet, there are those
who love it-

Webster's tender eloquence was not lost upon his sympathetic listener.
Tears came to Marshall's eyes. Quite likely the mind and heart of the
Great Chief Justice went back to another small college which he had
attended and for which he had once been counsel. There were those
who loved it, too!
31. Id. at 640.
32. Perhaps the most noteworthy statement of Marshall in his less known college case
was a general observation, which in its context referred to institutions of learning, but
which was pregnant with governmental implications and indicative of a philosophy
of constitutional law:
In institutions, therefore, which are to be durable, only great leading and general
principles, ought to be immutable. 3 Call 573, 581 (1790).
33. Quoted in 4 BavEaanx 248-249.

